


THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS IN ALLIED STRATEG

The Cape Verde Islands, lying only 480 miles due west of Dakar, command sea-lanes and air-routes vital to inter-allied supply. Their relation to West Africa and South America is analogous to that of the Azores to Europe and North America.

Shipping routes around the Cape of Good Hope to
Britain, shipping routes from South America, toiBritain,
sir routes from Britain to South Africa, air routes from
both Britain and the United States across Africa-- all these
pass close to the Cape Verdes, within striking distance of
the formidable Vichy outpost at Dakar.

Enemy submarines would find in the Islands an ideal base for attacks on Allied shipping. Enemy bombers as well could wreak havor from the excellent fields already available. Three of the Islands nearest Africa (Sal, Sao Tiago, and Maio) possess first-class airfields, until recently used by Lati and Air France. Two of these fields (on tal Island) can accommodate even the heaviest military erefi. Hore fields could be constructed without much confiduntly or expense.



In the event of hostile occupation, our vital air route from Brazil across Africa, by which we supply the British and the Russians, would be directly exposed to attack. In like manner, the British Alternate Air Route, by way of Bathurst to Khartum and the Far East, would be imperiled.

Occupation of the Islands would be a relatively easy matter. Portuguese reinforcements and armaments have been only recently sent and are probably not formidable. No real resistance is to be expected from the population, which is at present racked by famine.

But the Islands would be easier to take than to hold. Daker has been heavily fortified and manned, and the French have but recently constructed a number of sirficies in west Africa. Axis forces, if in control of laker, would be much nearer the Cape Verdes than would American or British forces. They could, therefore, launch heavy ettacks by both air and sea.

Hence any action by Americans or British must be made in full force, and should be part of a larger operation against larger. To hole the Islands against hostile

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forces on the African Coast would be hopeless. The occupation must be viewed in connection with the whole West African problem. On the solution of this problem depends the outcome of the Battle of the Atlantic and the maintenance of our supply-lines to the Near East, Soviet Russian and even the Far East.

Present at Conferences of Latember &. 1941.
November 8. 1941 and Taxomber W., 1941.

Mr. Etefan Mighelphi, Major (Reserve) in the Polich Army (Intiliery) and Manager of the Dank of Colond

Mr. Stefar Midmarki, Jg.

Mr. Januar Moltowski, Figure 191 Consector of the Embracy of Polynd

Colonel William J. Donovan .

Mr. Turner McBaine

Mr. Richard Reppner

Mr. James R. Murphy

TO: Colonel Donovan

November 14, 1941

FROM: Turner H. McBaine

Attached hereto is the final report of our interview with Mr. Michalski.

The following is our a praisal of his qualities as an informer:

Er. Hichalski is a high-grade, intelligent educated man, whose adinion of general conditions and trends may be given some weight, but the is not a close observer or accurate reporter of detail. For a man the had spent 14 menths in Dekar he could give surprisingly few socific facts, although I believe that lack of a first-class interpreter was martly to blaze. Although he maint incd a seemingly objective attitude, he was very nervous, and the impression I got from his whole story was that a cid not think much of the British, at least so far as Fakar is concerned.

Turner H. Mesaine Epochal Assistant

it like it jerson. However, in my orinion, he is not a differ military observer. I write him numerous questions which a military observer could be another than the second to the live is entire to of the defent forces and cefenses can be relied on. Furthermore, I cannot believe but his hard single experiences we muit him to make an objective estiment in the morse of the defences. His a mentities gree ith other generalities which he is y nor do but he does not had much that it is early income.

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Colonel Denovan

November 14, 1941

Mr. Michalski has an 18 year old son who was with him the entire time in Dakar, went to high school there and had many friends among the French boys. Mr. Zoltowski believes that he could give many details his father could not. Do you think it would be worth while to bring him down to rashington for an interview?

I believe i pule be extremely helpful to have a question and answer shorthand reporter available for future important interviers here. Yould you like se to arrange for this?

T.H.MeB.

Attuch. THMch/ecj